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11 Introduction
Empirically, it appears that a monetary contraction is associated with a liq-
uidity eﬀect, according to which the the nominal short-term interest rate
increases(see e.g. Christiano and Eichenbaum, 1992; Christiano et al., 1997).
However, in most theoretical models the response of nominal interest rates to
a monetary contraction is determined by the Fisher eﬀect, which implies that
the lower expected rate of inﬂation associated with the reduction in mone-
tary growth leads to a decline in nominal interest rates. Consequently these
models have been unable to explain the liquidity eﬀect. Lucas (1990), Fuerst
(1992) and Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992) construct general equilibrium
models with limited-participation frictions that can generate a liquidity ef-
fect. In these models, households only infrequently re-optimize their asset
holdings and therefore monetary surprises have to be absorbed by the agents
that participate in ﬁnancial markets at the time of the surprise. Due to
the rigidity of households’ portfolios, a reduction in liquidity increases the
nominal interest rate despite its impact on expected inﬂation. Thus, what
ultimately results in a liquidity eﬀect in these models is the assumption that
only a subset of the agents in the economy has to absorb variations in liq-
uidity. 1
A typical assumption in limited participation models is that the business
sector has to absorb liquidity injections (see e.g. Christiano and Eichenbaum,
1992; Christiano et al., 1997). Intuitively, monetary injections increase the
amount of loanable funds in the ﬁnancial sector and ﬁnancial intermediaries
provide additional loans to the ﬁrms in the economy. However, not all ﬁrms
in the economy rely on bank loans. Hence, monetary injections should be
1Despite their success in generating a liquidity eﬀect, limited-participation models suﬀer
mainly from two shortcomings: Their inability to generate persistent liquidity eﬀects and
the relatively strong inﬂation response.
2largely absorbed by ﬁrms that borrow from intermediaries as opposed to
ﬁrms that participate directly on ﬁnancial markets. Since the relative size of
the sector that receives monetary injections has implications for the liquidity
eﬀect (see e.g. Cole and Ohanian, 2002), it follows that the interest rate
response to policy shocks may vary across ﬁnancial systems.2 The purpose
of this paper is to highlight this link between the ﬁnancial system and the
strength of the liquidity eﬀect.
A similar point is emphasized in the literature on the bank lending chan-
nel. This branch of the literature argues that monetary policy inﬂuences real
economic activity via the reserves of the banking sector (see e.g. Bernanke
and Gertler, 1995). Consequently, the size of the sector which ultimately
has to absorb variations in liquidity or reserves of the banking sector should
be closely related to the number of ﬁrms that rely mostly on banks to ob-
tain external ﬁnance. This similarity between the bank lending channel and
the limited participation assumption has not received much attention in the
literature (see Kashyap and Stein, 1994).
Despite a large literature that documents the liquidity eﬀect in the data
(see e.g. others Christiano et al., 1999; Fung and Kasumovich, 1998; Hamil-
ton, 1997; Cushman and Zha, 1997; Grilli and Roubini, 1996), diﬀerences
in the liquidity eﬀect across countries and ﬁnancial systems have received
only limited attention. Lastrapes and McMillin (2004) study cross-country
diﬀerences in the liquidity eﬀect and ﬁnd that variables associated with the
size of the ﬁnancial intermediary sector have explanatory power for the cross-
country variation in the strength of the liquidity eﬀect.
The model applied in this paper is a variant of the limited participation
model in Christiano et al. (1997) which allows for an heterogenous business
2See Allen and Gale (2000) for a classiﬁcation and comparison of ﬁnancial systems.
3sector. Due to a simple informational friction, some ﬁrms in the economy
cannot issue bonds directly and rely on bank loans to obtain working capital.
The remaining ﬁrms issue corporate bonds. This modiﬁcation of an otherwise
standard limited participation model makes the model consistent with the
main characteristics of the bank lending channel as emphasized by Kashyap
and Stein (1994): Some ﬁrms in the economy are dependent on bank loans as
a source of external ﬁnance, banks cannot easily compensate policy induced
variations in liquidity and money is non-neutral.
The main result of the paper is that monetary shocks lead to larger liquid-
ity eﬀects in market-based ﬁnancial systems. Intuitively, monetary injections
have to be absorbed by a smaller number of ﬁrms in market-based systems
and therefore these shocks become relatively important at the level of the
individual bank-dependent. It follows that the interest rate has to move
substantially. However, output and inﬂation responses are similar across ﬁ-
nancial systems, as long as the size of the liquidity shock is constant. The
model also suggests that the real eﬀects of monetary policy shocks are larger
in bank-based systems if the monetary authority targets interest rates and
adjusts liquidity endogenously.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the
model. Section 3 presents the simulations and discusses the results. Section
4 summarizes and concludes the paper.
2 Model
The model presented in this section is a variant of the limited participation
model in Christiano et al. (1997), hence the description will be brief. The
economy consists of households, ﬁnancial intermediaries, a monetary author-
ity and a business sector. Firms have to borrow working capital in the form
4of cash at the beginning of the period to ﬁnance the wage bill which is paid in
advance of production. Some ﬁrms are subject to idiosyncratic shocks which
are not veriﬁable by the households. This assumption ensures that these
ﬁrms have to borrow from the ﬁnancial intermediaries. The remaining ﬁrms
can issue directly placed debt instruments. Monetary policy is conducted in
terms of cash injections which are placed in the households’ accounts at the
ﬁnancial intermediaries. Households have to decide on deposits, bond and
money holdings before the monetary shocks are realized.
2.1 Firms
The business sector of the economy consists of a continuum of ﬁrms nor-
malized to have unit mass. The ﬁrms produce a homogenous consumption
good and are of two types, depending on whether their output is subject











1 with probability π
0 with probability 1 − π
for i ∈ [0,λ] and θi = 1 for i ∈ [λ,1]. Hence, ﬁrms in the interval [0,λ]
can only repay their debt with probability π. In case of default, ﬁrms can
walk away from their debt obligations. Moreover, the realizations of θi are not
publicly observable for i ∈ [0,λ], only the ﬁnancial intermediaries have access
to a monitoring technology that allows veriﬁcation of the realizations of θi.
Since labor is paid in advance of production, ﬁrms have to borrow working
capital to ﬁnance the wage bill. In principle, each ﬁrm has two sources of
5credit. They can either issue nominal bonds which are sold directly to the
households or they can enter into debt contracts with a ﬁnancial intermediary.
However, since the realizations of the idiosyncratic shocks are not public
knowledge, ﬁrms in the interval [0,λ] have an incentive to misreport their
output and default on bonds owned by households. Consequently, these
ﬁrms will not be able to issue bonds in the ﬁrst place and will be forced to
borrow from the ﬁnancial intermediaries instead. Since all borrowing and







= (1 − α)H
−α
it , (2)
for i ∈ [0,λ], where Wt is the nominal wage, Pt denotes the price level and
RL
t is the bank-lending rate.
For ﬁrms in the interval i ∈ [λ,1], the fact that θi = 1 is common knowl-
edge, therefore debt contracts do not involve any default risk. Hence, these
ﬁrms are able to sell bonds directly to the households without the need for a







= (1 − α)H
−α
it , (3)
for i ∈ [λ,1], where RB
t denotes the yield on corporate bonds. RL
t > RB
t will
always be satisﬁed in equilibrium, hence ﬁrms always have an incentive to
issue bonds. Note that although ﬁrms in the interval i ∈ [0,λ] are subject to
idiosyncratic shocks, the probability π does not appear in (2), since ﬁrms can
walk away from debt obligations in case of default. Thus, although Yit > 0
only with probability π, debt has to be repaid only with probability π. It
follows that π drops out of (2). At the end of the period loans and bonds are
repaid and proﬁts are distributed to the households.
62.2 Households















where ψ,ψ0 > 0 are parameters, β is a discount factor, Ct is consumption in
period t and Lt denotes labor supply in period t. At the beginning of each
period households hold the entire stock of money, Mt−1, and must decide how
much money to use for consumption in the current period, for deposits at the
ﬁnancial intermediaries, At, and for purchases of bonds, Bt, issued by ﬁrms.
Deposits yield a gross interest rate of RD
t . Interest rates are determined
after the state of the world is revealed. Nominal labor income, LtWt, can
be used for purchases in the goods market in the current period. Hence, the
households face the following cash-in-advance constraint:
PtCt ≤ Mt−1 − At − Bt + WtLt. (5)
The amount of money the households carry over into the next period is
Mt = Mt−1 − At − Bt + WtLt − PtCt + R
D
t (At + Xt) + R
B
t Bt + Dt, (6)
where Dt is the sum of all proﬁts of the ﬁrms distributed at the end of period
t and Xt represents a cash injection by the central bank.
2.3 Financial Intermediaries
At the beginning of the period, ﬁnancial intermediaries receive deposits from
the households and cash injections from the monetary authority. The total
amount of loanable funds, At + Xt, is used to provide loans to ﬁrms which
cannot borrow from households directly. In contrast to households, ﬁnancial
intermediaries can observe the realization of idiosyncratic shocks and are
7therefore able to enforce debt contracts. For simplicity, ﬁnancial intermedi-
ation and monitoring are assumed to be costless and competitive. At the
end of the period, the ﬁnancial intermediaries receive payments from their
solvent borrowers and return deposits with interest to the household. The
remaining proﬁts are paid to the households as dividends.
The objective of the ﬁnancial intermediary is to choose the optimal amount
of loans to maximize dividends given by Ft = π(At +Xt)RL
t −(At +Xt)RD
t .
Free entry into the banking sector ensures that RD
t = πRL
t and that Ft =
RD
t Xt will be paid to the households in form of dividends.
There is a clear role for ﬁnancial intermediaries in this environment since
without the intermediaries, bank-dependent ﬁrms would have no opportunity
to borrow working capital and would be cut oﬀ from production. Further-
more, the ﬁnancial intermediaries can eliminate idiosyncratic default risk by
lending to an inﬁnite number of borrowers (see Diamond, 1984).
2.4 Monetary Authority
The monetary authority provides liquidity to the ﬁnancial sector of the econ-
omy. As in Christiano et al. (1997) the monetary growth rate, xt, follows a
three-state Markov process: xt ∈ {µ + σ,µ,µ − σ} and qij = Prob(xt+1 =
xj|xt = xi) for i,j = 1,2,3.
2.5 Equilibrium
A stationary competitive equilibrium for the model is characterized by stochas-
tic sequences of allocations, prices and monetary growth rates such that: (i)
The household’s lifetime utility is maximized subject to the constraints (5)
and (6). (ii) The necessary conditions (2) and (3) which determine optimal
borrowing for bank-dependent ﬁrms and for bond-issuing ﬁrms hold. (iii)
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3 Calibration and Results
To explore the quantitative properties of the model, parameter values have
to be assigned. As it is standard in the literature, the discount factor is set to
β = 0.99. For the labor supply elasticity, 1/ψ, a value of unity is chosen and
ψ0 is adjusted such that labor supply is equal to unity in each simulation.
The parameter α in the production function is set to 0.36. The money
growth process is calibrated as in Christiano et al. (1997): The unconditional
monetary growth rate is set to µ = 0.02, for σ the value 0.017 is chosen and
qij = 1/3 for i,j = 1,2,3. The repayment probability π is set to 0.99.3 The
resulting default probability is close to the values chosen by Cooley and Nam
(1998) and by Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997).
3.1 Simulation Results
All results are reported as elasticities with respect to a one percent reduc-
tion in the end-of-period money stock. Interest rates are reported as semi-
elasticities and can be interpreted as percentage point changes.
Table 1 displays the impact responses generated by the model to an unan-
ticipated fall in the monetary growth rate for diﬀerent values of λ. The re-
sponse of the deposit rate, dRD
t , declines with an increase in the relative size
of the bank-dependent sector. Similarly, the reaction of the bank-lending
3As a sensitivity analysis, the simulations have been repeated with diﬀerent values for
π. Results are rather robust.
9rate, dRL
t , varies inversely with λ. Although a similar pattern can be ob-
served for the bond yield, the response is substantially smaller in this case.
Table 1: Responses to a Monetary Contraction for diﬀerent degrees of bank-
dependence
λ 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90
dRD 7.19 3.35 2.18 1.62 1.29 1.07 0.91 0.80 0.71
dRL 7.26 3.39 2.20 1.63 1.30 1.08 0.92 0.81 0.72
dRB 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
dY -0.35 -0.32 -0.31 -0.30 -0.30 -0.30 -0.29 -0.29 -0.29
dP -0.65 -0.68 -0.69 -0.70 -0.70 -0.70 -0.71 -0.71 -0.71
dH -0.48 -0.47 -0.46 -0.46 -0.46 -0.46 -0.46 -0.45 -0.45
Notes: dY ,dH are percentage changes in output and labor in response to a one percent
decrease in the end-of-period-money stock. dRD, dRL, dRB are percentage point changes
in the deposit rate, the bank-lending rate and the bond rate in response to a one percent
decrease in the end-of-period-money stock.
Intuitively, for low values of λ, only a small number of ﬁrms competes for
bank loans and since the size of the monetary shock is constant across the
experiments considered, each bank-dependent ﬁrm has to absorb a relatively
large amount of the monetary injection. Consequently the bank-lending rate
has to adjust markedly to restore equilibrium on the market for loans. The
deposit rate responds strongly, since it is tightly linked to the bank-lending
rate via the ﬁnancial intermediary’s zero-proﬁt conditions. The bond yield
response is small since the monetary tightening hits primarily the bank-
dependent ﬁrms.
Overall, we can conclude that the size of the liquidity eﬀect depends on
the fraction of bank-dependent ﬁrms since this fraction also determines the
size of the sector which has to absorb policy induced variations in liquid-
ity. Moreover, the corporate bond yield is only marginally inﬂuenced by the
liquidity eﬀect. Thus, in line with the bank lending view, monetary policy
has a substantially larger impact on interest rates related to ﬁnancial inter-
10mediaries than on market rates. More generally, the reaction of the interest
rates in the model is in line with results in Berger and Udell (1992), who ﬁnd
that the spread between the bank-lending rate and the Treasury Bill rate
increases during a credit crunch. Similar results are presented in Kashyap
et al. (1993) for the spread between the prime rate and the commercial paper
rate.
The remaining lines of Table 1 show the responses of the price level,
aggregate hours and output. For high values of λ the results broadly match
those reported by Christiano et al. (1997). For extremely low values of λ,
output and hours respond somewhat stronger. However, the response of
aggregate output varies only from −0.33 percent for λ = 0.2 to −0.29 percent
for λ = 0.9, which appears to be a small range. Thus, despite the variation
in the liquidity eﬀect, the model suggests that the response of output to a
monetary contraction of a given size does not vary substantially with the
fraction of bank-dependent ﬁrms.
This result can be understood by looking at how individual bank-dependent
and bond-issuing ﬁrms respond to the monetary contraction. Table 2 dis-
plays dHi and dYi which denote the elasticities of labor demand and output
of bank-dependent ﬁrms (i = 1) and bond-issuing ﬁrms (i = 2) for diﬀerent
values for λ.
For any value of λ considered, output and labor demand of bank-dependent
ﬁrms respond negatively to a monetary contraction and the magnitude of
the response varies strongly with the fraction of bank-dependent ﬁrms in the
economy. Bond-issuing ﬁrms respond positively to a monetary contraction
and the output and labor demand responses are rather stable across diﬀerent
values for λ. Bond-issuing ﬁrms increase their level of activity since the real
wage declines so strongly that hiring costs decline despite the higher interest
11Table 2: Labor Demand and Output Responses of Bank-Dependent and
Bond-Issuing Firms to a Monetary Contraction
λ 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90
dH1 -17.24 -7.54 -4.51 -3.04 -2.16 -1.59 -1.18 -0.88 -0.64
dY1 -11.03 -4.83 -2.89 -1.94 -1.39 -1.02 -0.76 -0.56 -0.41
dH2 1.13 1.15 1.15 1.16 1.16 1.16 1.16 1.16 1.16
dY2 0.73 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.74
Notes: dH1 and dY1 denote the elasticities of labor demand and output of bank-dependent
ﬁrms and dH2 and dY2 denote the elasticities of labor demand and output of bond-issuing
ﬁrms in response to a one percent decrease in the end-of-period-money stock.
rate. This result is consistent with empirical evidence presented in Gertler
and Gilchrist (1994), who ﬁnd that bank loans to small manufacturing ﬁrms
decline when the Fed tightens monetary policy, whereas large ﬁrms actually
increase their external ﬁnancing by issuing commercial paper.
Overall, most of the variation in the output eﬀect comes from bank-
dependent ﬁrms with the largest impact on these ﬁrms for low values of
λ. However, low values of λ also imply that the output responses of bank-
dependent ﬁrms only have a small impact on aggregate output. A higher
value for λ increases the degree to which aggregate output is inﬂuenced by
the output responses of bank-dependent ﬁrms, but at the same time decreases
the eﬀect a monetary shock has on these ﬁrms. For plausible values of λ these
two eﬀects largely cancel out in the aggregate. Consequently, the impact of a
monetary contraction on aggregate output is only slightly inﬂuenced by the
fraction of bank-dependent ﬁrms in the economy.
The main implication of the simulations reported here is that the liquidity
eﬀect is negatively related to the size of the bank-dependent sector. How
does this result compare to the empirical evidence? Lastrapes and McMillin
(2004) present evidence based on a sample of industrialized countries and ﬁnd
that the liquidity eﬀect tends to be smaller in countries characterized by a
12larger banking sector. Since it appears plausible that the size of the banking
sector is correlated with the fraction of bank-dependent ﬁrms, this empirical
result is consistent with the relationship between the ﬁnancial system and
the liquidity eﬀect discussed here.
4 Summary
This paper analyzes the link between the ﬁnancial system and the strength
of the liquidity eﬀect in a limited participation model. The model suggests
that bank-based ﬁnancial systems should be associated with smaller liquid-
ity eﬀects than market-based systems. Intuitively, in a bank-based system
a large number of ﬁrms depends on bank loans. Thus, since liquidity is in-
jected through the banking sector, policy induced variations in liquidity are
ultimately absorbed by a large number of ﬁrms. Consequently, the interest
rate responds only modestly since each individual ﬁrm has to absorb only a
small fraction of the liquidity shock.
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